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Abstract—Resource-constrained devices are unable to maintain
a full copy of the Bitcoin Blockchain in memory. This paper
proposes a bidirectional payment channel framework for IoT
devices. This framework utilizes Bitcoin Lightning-Network-like
payment channels with low processing and storage requirements.
This protocol enables IoT devices to open and maintain payment
channels with traditional Bitcoin nodes without a view of the
blockchain. Unlike existing solutions, it does not require a trusted
third party to interact with the blockchain nor does it burden the
peer-to-peer network in the way SPV clients do. The contribution
of this paper includes a secure and crypto-economically fair
protocol for bidirectional Bitcoin payment channels. In addition,
we demonstrate the security and fairness of the protocol by
formulating it as a game in which the equilibrium is reached
when all players follow the protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTERNET of Things (IoT) services and devices are ex-panding at an exponential pace due to the rapid expan-
sion of networking technologies. Today many companies are
jumping into an IoT arms race across various application
domains including smart home, connected health, wearables,
connected car, smart retail, supply chain, and many more.
One key observation is that smart IoT devices are increasingly
replacing our physical credit cards, enabling a faster and easier
way for us to order products and pay services on demand.
However, many problems exist concerning payment services
through IoT devices, such as identity verification, security and
privacy (e.g., financial information protection), scalability and
flexibility (e.g., accidental ordering, refunds).
Blockchain technology has been proposed to play a pow-
erful role to address those challenges in IoT payment ser-
vices. Blockchains are based on cryptographically secured,
immutable distributed ledger technology which operate in a
distributed fashion, and thus have the potential to enhance
IoT solutions with better automated resource optimization,
data security and reliability. For example, [1] describes how
blockchain can facilitate sharing of services and the automa-
tion of work flows; [2] overviews the blockchain integration
and projects within the energy sector including markets, op-
erations and stability, and security of the grid.
The integration of IoT and blockchain has huge potential
in revolutionizing IoT. IoT devices that interact with the
physical world can transfer value in exchange for services and
blockchains can provide a value transfer protocol. Applications
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in Industrial IoT such as metering infrastructure in utilities
including gas, electricity and water as well as electric vehicle
charging and supply chain management can benefit from
value transfer using blockchain technology. Transactions on
blockchains can build trust between devices without relying on
a trusted third party intermediary. Decentralized trustless value
ledgers in the form of blockchains have gained increasing
traction as trust-less value transfer protocols. Another novelty
of blockchain technology is the design of a crypto-economic
consensus algorithm which relaxes the assumption that some
number of agents are honest to economically rational. This
creates a state that as long as participants value money (or
digital cash), they will behave in a way that results in their
own best interest, i.e., highest profits. By design, blockchain
consensus ensures correct operations of a decentralized public
database that records users’ account balances. Blockchain
technology allows for users to transfer value to other users
without the help of trusted third parties such as PayPal or
Visa.
The main advantage of blockchain is its trust-less value
transfer protocol, which is securely maintained through de-
centralized participants. However, the blockchain technology
does not solve all problems, specifically, blockchains suffer
from limited scalability due to their decentralized nature.
Additionally, the limited scalability can drive up the cost of
using the blockchain network through high fees. In this work,
we focus on using blockchain payment channels which enables
scalability. We design a payment channel protocol based on
the Lightning Network, which enables IoT devices with few
computational and storage resources to transfer value. In
particular, our protocol enables a party to transact with another
using the Bitcoin blockchain without storing the complete
blockchain using untrusted third parties. Figure 1 shows the
architecture of our blockchain protocol in reference to the rest
of the blockchain.
The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides background on blockchain and its payment channels.
Section III presents a protocol design that enables real-time
payment channels for IoT devices to gateway services. We
analyze the security of the protocol by formulating it as a
game in Section IV. Finally, we describe the related work
in Section V and conclude in Section VI with future work
directions.
II. BACKGROUND
Blockchain technology at its core is an immutable pub-
lic digital ledger containing transactions. The novelty of
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Fig. 1. IoT devices in the Bitcoin Blockchain context. The IoT device has a
payment channel open to a gateway service and does not have a local copy
of the blockchain. Instead, the IoT device relies on untrusted third parties to
connect on its behalf through economic incentives.
blockchain is its ability to unequivocally agree on the state
of the ledger in a decentralized setting. Through the process
of mining, the global state of the blockchain advances.
The Bitcoin blockchain [3] provides the ability to send
transactions which consist of inputs, outputs, and rules gov-
erning the redemption of the outputs. Inputs to transactions
map to the source of the funds (a previous transaction) while
the outputs represent the destination of the transaction value.
The governing rules included in the transaction dictate how the
recipient of the transaction is able to spend the received value
in the future. A common rule is for the recipient to prove
ownership of a private key associated with the destination
address in the transaction. However, more detailed rules can
be expressed to provide more complicated value redemption
logic.
In general, Bitcoin follows the UTXO model which says
that an input to a new Bitcoin transaction is the output
of an unspent previous transaction along with a script that
redeems the previous transactions output. The output of the
new transaction provides the recipient and a script telling the
recipient how to redeem the values. Since the blockchain is
an immutable public database, transactions cannot be revoked
and the total of all unspent transaction outputs represent the
current state of the Blockchain. Thus, there is no concept of
users or accounts included in the Bitcoin Blockchain.
Transactions are organized into blocks which remain pend-
ing until a partial pre-image is found for the sha-256 hash
algorithm which meets a specific criteria quantified as the
blockchain’s difficulty. This difficulty is a dynamic variable
that corresponds to the processing power of participants work-
ing to add new blocks and transactions into the blockchain.
The result of this process maintains that on average new blocks
are added to the blockchain every 10 minutes. In alternative
blockchain implementations, the target block interval varies,
e.g., 15 seconds in Ethereum [4]. This interval is important to
note because until a transaction is included in a block it is not
considered verified by the blockchain network. Furthermore,
due to the consensus algorithm that governs the blockchain,
there may be a temporary fork where multiple valid blocks
are at the same height. A block is only valid if it is part
of the longest blockchain. Confidence of immutability grows
exponentially in relation to the depth of the block, i.e., number
of subsequent blocks. The original Bitcoin white paper [3]
provides a more detailed analysis. However, one heuristic used
in practice is 6 blocks (about 60 minutes)[5].
Figure 2 shows the cost of sending a transaction converted
to USD over four months in 2018. The cost of a transaction
on the blockchain as well as the time required to publish
the transaction makes frequent real-time transactions impos-
sible. Another method to reduce fees is to use an alternative
blockchain that has larger block sizes or more frequent blocks.
Although alternative blockchains can have weaker security,
and greater price volatility that does not satisfy our goals in
this work. In this paper, we propose a protocol using off-chain
payment channels that can provide real-time payment but do
not incur large fees with frequent posting to the blockchain.
A. Off-Chain Bitcoin Transactions
Bitcoin’s Forth-like scripting language enables more com-
plex functionality by placing conditions on the redeeming of
transaction outputs. For example, time locks can be used on
transactions and transaction outputs to place temporal restric-
tions on the ability to spend or create transactions. Time locks
can be both relative and absolute and can prevent a transaction
output from being spent until after a certain time. Time locks
are one of the most important building blocks in off-chain
Bitcoin Transactions, such as in the Bitcoin Lightning Network
[6]. Multisignatures can require multiple keys to spend a
transaction output. One use case for multisignatures is joint
savings accounts where both parties need to agree to make a
transaction. Time lock contracts include primitives [5] such as
• nLockTime specifies the minimum height of the
blockchain that a transaction can be included in.
• CheckLockTimeVerify requires that the blockchain
be at a certain height for the output of an already included
transaction to be spent.
• Relative LockTime places restrictions on the inclu-
sion of an input to a new transaction based on the time
that the input was included in the previous transaction.
• CheckSequenceVerify provides a relative time that
the output of a transaction becomes valid after inclusion
in a block.
• Multisig can be used to require m−of−n signatures
to become valid.
nLockTime and Relative Locktime are corresponding
counterparts for absolute and relative time respectively for in-
clusion into the blockchain while CheckLockTimeVerify
3and CheckSequenceVerify are counterparts for absolute
and relative time respectively for making outputs of a valid
transaction spendable.
Hashlocks on the other-hand provide encumbrance on the
outputs of transaction that requires a specified secret value
being publicly revealed. Upon unlocking the hashlock, all
other hashlocks with the same secret value are also unlocked
due to the secret value being recorded on the blockchain.
The combination of hashlocks and timelocks can create
timed hashlock contracts (HTLCs) which can be used to put
Bitcoin transactions ’off-chain’ through what is called L2
or layer 2 scaling solutions, such as the Lightning Network
[6], Duplex micropayment channels[7], and Raiden [8]. Our
protocol uses CheckSequenceVerify and Multisig for
payment channels similar to Lightning Network Transactions.
Off-chain transactions are properly formatted Bitcoin transac-
tions that are deferred from being published immediately on
the blockchain. The benefit is that off-chain transactions can be
updated many times before published to the blockchain result-
ing in reduced on-chain transactions and ultimately fewer fees.
In [7], channels can be created unidirectional or in duplex, and
transactions can be updated so that the final channel balances
are guaranteed to be included. This is accomplished by newer
transactions having smaller timelocks than earlier transactions,
and thus being able to be published sooner than old invalidated
transactions. A limitation of this approach is that channels will
have finite lives. References [6] and [8] allow for channels to
remain open indefinitely or until the owners decide to close
the channel.
In those solutions, transactions are properly formatted so
that either party involved can post the transaction at any time
to the blockchain in case of dispute. This property allows
for the protocol to remain trustless. To avoid the problem of
excessive fees, transactions are updated off-chain to reflect
a new balance and only publish them upon closure to the
blockchain. Therefore, fees only need to be paid when opening
and closing a channel and updating the balance within the
channel is fee-less.
Because IoT devices are resource limited, it is infeasible
to assume that they can remain connected to the blockchain.
Therefore, we need to adopt the state channel model to
allow for one (or both) parties to be offline from the Bitcoin
blockchain. In this work, we assume that the IoT devices have
networking capability to untrusted third parties. By providing
financial incentives to the third parties, the IoT devices do not
need to have direct access to the blockchain and can instead
rely on the untrusted third parties to act as a bridge to ensure
correct operation of the protocol.
III. PROTOCOL DESIGN
The intuition of our protocol is to use a multisig transaction
to fund the channel. Intermediate states are made revocable as
developed in [6]. Our contribution is to ensure correctness
and crypto-economical fairness when one party does not have
access to the blockchain. To do this, we use a third party to
post transactions to the blockchain by creating an additional
output that is spendable by the third party. By creating an
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Fig. 2. Average transaction fee from Feb. to June 2018 in USD. Calculated
using the blocksci library [9].
economic incentive, a third party is willing to participate in
the protocol. Furthermore, to ensure that the second party does
not violate the protocol by publishing a revoked state, a third
party is used as a watchdog, which informs the first party when
the funding transaction’s output is used as an input to a new
transaction. This watchdog will report when an intermediate
state is posted to the blockchain, which prevents publishing
an expired state. Additionally, to prevent collusion between
the second party and the third parties, we use a pool of third
parties for each service. Since any member in the third party
is able to take the role, the incentive needs to be higher than
any incentive from colluding. In Section IV, we formulate the
problem as a game and show that the equilibrium is reached
by following the protocol.
The details of the protocol are as follows. For each
IoT device A, the IoT payment gateway B creates
a payment channel. Both A and B generate 3 sets
of j keypairs (pk {B|A} j {a|b|c}, sk {B|A} j {a|b|c}) such
that each intermediate transaction uses a different key-
pair making j the number of intermediate states. Ad-
ditionally, we generate a keypair for opening and clos-
ing the channel, (pk {B|A} {FT |close}, sk {B|A} {FT |close}),
and another pair for A transacting with the third parties,
(pk A 3rd {a|rc}, sk A 3rd {a|rc}). To minimizes the IoT de-
vices’ memory requirements, we use BIP32 that provides
a deterministic hierarchical key generation algorithm with a
highly compacted data structure [10]. All keys can then be
generated with a given master key and an index in the data
structure. Effectively this enables the storing of an index in
place of a keypair, as the total requirements for storing a state
is the key index and the balances.
The two parties agree to place a Funding Transaction TFT
on the blockchain that sends ΩA and ΩB as input funds from A
and B respectively. The output of the channel is a 2-of-2 multi-
signature requiring both A and B’s sk{B|A} FT to spend.
Additionally, the two parties agree on an initial commitment
transaction TC1 that is a valid spending of the funds from TFT
4as the input and returning ΩA and ΩB as the outputs. Note
that the transaction is not published to the blockchain, and
its purpose is to denote the starting balance in the payment
channel. Reference [6] shows how two transactions, TC1 B
and TC1 A can be constructed so that B is the only party that
can publish TC1 A and A is the only party that can publish
TC1 B . This mechanism is accomplished by supplying one of
the 2-of-2 input signatures required to spend TFT ’s output,
i.e., partially signing the transaction.
Furthermore, the transactions TC1 B and TC1 A are made
revocable by encumbering the outputs of the corresponding
party’s ability to send the output. For example, if A publishes
TC1 B , the output of ΩB can be redeemed immediately by
B. However, ΩA funds are locked. There are two ways to
redeem the locked funds. The first is to use A and B’s secret
keys sk1s for a 2-of-2 multi-signature. The second is to use a
timelock to redeem the fund to A after W blocks, where W
is the number of blocks specified in the timelock. B may use
the first mechanism to steal all of As funds after both parties
update the state of the channel to the new transactions TC2 B
and TC2 A. Upon updating, A sends sk1 to B (and B sends
sk1 to A). The stealing of funds relies on the mechanism to
prevent old transactions from being published, which can be
achieved by B checking the blockchain before some W blocks
after TC1 B is published. This mechanism is a way to ensure
that both parties follow the protocol even if the two parties do
not trust each other.
However, since the IoT devices are assumed not to have a di-
rect access to the blockchain, two disjoint groups of untrusted
third parties are used to interface between the IoT device and
the blockchain. Each group has multiple members, K1 and
K2 respectfully, to prevent collusion with B. The first group
is used to publish a transaction to the blockchain incentivized
through a small fee as an output to the transaction. The second
group ensures that if B publishes an old transaction that the
IoT device is notified of the transaction and is able to spend
the transaction output before the timelock W expires for B
to redeem their funds. This second group is also incentivized
through small fees in Bitcoin smart contracts. Transactions 3-5
show the method to do this. In order to prevent third parties
colluding with each other or B, the number of members in
each third party has to be chosen with respect to the quantity
of fees as well as to the channel balances.
When both parties agree on the closing of a channel,
they can create a new transaction TFin that uses ΩA fin
and ΩB fin as the final output balances, and post it to
the blockchain. If both parties follow the protocol properly,
only two transactions, TFT and TFin, are published to the
blockchain. If one party tries to publish an old state of the
channel TCi (B/A), the other party can detect this and take all
the funds in the channel.
Transaction 1, the funding transaction, contains two or more
inputs, and one or more outputs. The channel funding output is
a multisignature output requiring both parties to sign in order
to use as an input into a new transaction.
Transaction 2, is used upon mutual channel closing, it uses
the multisignature output from the funding transaction and
uses multiple outputs to both A and B. If the IoT device
wishes to post the transaction, a fee σ can be placed in an
input for a third party to be incentivized to publish.
Transaction 3 takes the funding transactions output as input
and creates 3 outputs. The first output is local to A, the party
with the ability to publish it. This output is encumbered by
a timelock of W blocks to A’s address to ensure that if the
transaction is old. In other words, A has given a key pair
(pk {A} j {c}, sk {A} j {c}) to B, and B can redeem this input.
The second output is the remote output to B. Finally, there is
a third output, which is the incentive for a third party to send
the transaction to the blockchain and make sure the transaction
gets included in a block.
Transaction 4 takes the funding transactions output as input
and creates 2 outputs. Because A partially signs the input to
this transaction, only B is able to publish it. The first output
is timelocked by W blocks with an output to B. A is also
able to redeem this input given (pk {B} j {c}, sk {B} j {c}).
There is a third party watching the blockchain, whose key is
required for A to redeem this input. By doing so, the third
party also gets a fee in return.
Transaction 5 takes this as input and can be presigned. This
recovery transaction is used as a smart contract to incentivize
a third party to watch the blockchain by providing a fee
determined by the members of the third party. The second
output to Transaction 4 is used for a remote output to A.
The Bitcoin Scripts used for all the aforementioned transac-
tions are shown in Appendix A to provide a real-time payment
channel for IoT devices with an IoT gateway.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
To prove that our protocol design is crypto-economically
fair, we model the protocol as a game and demonstrate that
the equilibrium can always be reached as long as the players
follow the protocol and fees are appropriately set.
The payment channel in the Bitcoin Lightning Network
[6] can be modeled as a game between two actors. After
the channel is funded, Player I may post any previous states
and then Player II may choose to follow the protocol or
deviate. Following the protocol means to take the maximum
amount of funds, i.e., the remote transaction as well as the
local transaction, if the transaction is rescinded. Deviating
means to do nothing or to take just the remote funds. Let
us consider 3 transactions with Players I and II balances α, β
respectively. We define TX1 = (α1, β1), TX2 = (α2, β2), and
TX3 = (α3, β3), such that α2 > α1 > α3 and β3 > β1 > β2,
where TX1 is the current state of the channel, and TX2 and
TX3 are previous states where α and β are the values each
party has respectively in the channel at a state. Additionally,
α1 +β1 = α2 +β2 = α3 +β3 since the total amount of funds
in the channel is fixed. Player I’s strategies are which TX to
publish to the blockchain. Following the protocol, the strategy
is publishing TX1, while TX2 and TX3 is deviating from
the protocol. Player II’s strategies are Follow, Deviate 1, and
Deviate 2 as described above. The payoff matrix for this game
is shown in Table I. Player I experiences a maximum payout
under strategy D 1 if Player II chooses a deviating strategy.
However, since Player II has a pure strategy always to follow
5I/II F D 1 D 2
F β1 / α1 α2 + β2 / 0 α3 + β3 / 0
D 1 β1 / α1 β2 / α2 β3 / α3
D 2 0 / α1 0 / α2 0 / α3
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX OF PAYMENT CHANNEL GAME BETWEEN 2 PARTIES
the protocol, the equilibrium is reached when Player I also
follows the protocol. In this game, we show that in the life of
the channel, no player will be able to increase their profit if
the other player follows the protocol.
In our approach, we assume that one party does not have
access to the blockchain, and also with the addition of more
players, the game gets further complicated. The interesting
cases to evaluate are when one of the parties posts an inter-
mediate state to the blockchain. Let us consider four players in
the game, the IoT gateway, an IoT device, and two groups of
untrusted third parties. Player 1 is the IoT gateway with three
strategies, using the same set of transactions as the previous
game. Each strategy refers to posting a transaction to the
blockchain where strategy 1 is following the protocol. In the
first game where player 1 goes first (see Figure III), Player
4, the 3rd party that watches the blockchain for an output
of the funding transaction in a new transaction plays next.
Player 4 can either tell player 2 about the transaction (Strategy
F) or deviate from the protocol. Since Player 4 represents a
group of players, K2, any one of them can follow the protocol.
Therefore, in order to deviate, all Players in the group must
collude. If the players collude to perform a denial-of-service
attack, then no profit is gained. Therefore, it is not rational. On
the other hand, if the Player 4 members collude with Player 1
(Strategy D), then they can receive some payoff γ2K2 , where K2
is the number of members in the group and γ2 is the amount
that Player 1 offers which is bounded by α1.
If we show that γ2K2 is less than γ1, then Player 4 will not
be incentivized to deviate from the protocol. Player 2 will not
deviate from the protocol because they have a pure strategy to
follow the protocol. Finally, similarly to Player 4, Player 3 can
follow the protocol where any one member of K1 will earn
σ1. After many games, the average payout is σ1K1 . σ1 must be
large enough to cover the fee of spending the transaction as
well as for the bandwidth requirements in order to maintain a
connection to the IoT device. Additionally, in order to prevent
collusion between all the members in Player 3 and Player
1, σ2K1 is less than σ1. This forced inequality is the reason
for using multiple members in each group. If σ2K1 < σ1 andγ2
K2
< γ1 are true, then the equilibrium is reached when all
players follow the protocol correctly. In order to ensure these
inequalities hold, a minimum/maximum channel balance must
be enforced. Recall that α2 > α1 > α3, to evaluate the fees
of σ and γ, we can set TX2 to the intermediate state where
α2 = ∀i MAX(αi) and similarly TX3, α3 = ∀i MIN(αi)
Player 1 has the potential to maximize their potential
earnings when they deviate with strategy 2, by posting TX2
to the blockchain with earnings of α2 − σ2 and α2 − γ2 and
by colluding with Players 3 and 4 respectively. By enforcing
that
σ1 >
σ2
K1
≡ σ1 > α2 − α3
K1
and similarly for Player 4,
γ1 >
γ2
K2
≡ γ1 > α2 − α3
K2
we can show that the equilibrium is met when all players
follow the protocol because Player 3 and Player 4 will not
collude with Player 1.
If Player 2 makes the first move by posting a transaction
to the blockchain, the game is similar to the original payment
channel game shown in Table I. Player 1 will have a pure
strategy to follow the protocol. However, Player 3 can deviate
from the protocol by performing a denial-of-service attack
against Player 2. If Player 3 does this through collusion, the
game actually restarts. By incentivizing Player 3 and because
there is a pool of members in Player 3, it is not economically
rational to take that strategy. Therefore, using the fee structure
for σ as in the game when Player 1 goes first, equilibrium is
reached when all players follow the protocol. Although in both
equilibrium cases Player 4 does not get an incentive, they do
not know which strategy Player 1 has taken, thus their profit
is still maximized when following the protocol.
V. RELATED WORK
There are many alternative blockchains with various prop-
erties including privacy, support for more complex smart con-
tracts, and client software for interfacing with the blockchain,
as well as with various uses of blockchain technology in IoT.
A. Simplified Payment Verification
Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) clients are
lightweight Bitcoin clients [3], that do not need to store the
full state of the blockchain. Instead, they store the 80-byte
block headers. The block header contains a lot of information
as they are chained together and contain the Merkle root of
the transactions in each block. By providing an SPV client
with a Merkle proof, any node can convince an SPV client
that a transaction is included in the blockchain with high
security as it is not efficient to create fake block headers.
However, SPV clients rely on blockchain nodes to watch
for payments. With many IoT devices making payments,
there is no incentive for regular Bitcoin nodes to watch the
blockchain for specific transactions. Therefore, we argue that
SPV clients are a burden to the Bitcoin network and we
design our protocol to avoid these scalability limitations. In
practice, if the IoT device has storage for approximately 4
MB per year for storing block headers, then it is reasonable
to include the SPV client in addition to our protocol for even
greater security. However, our solution requires significantly
less data storage for IoT devices.
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B. Payment Channels
This work expands the Lightning Network [6] payment
channel system for IoT devices. The full Lightning Network
enables payments to be routed through third parties too while
we leave routing through third parties as future work in order
to fully integrate with the Lightning Network.
Bolt [11], is a protocol that enables private off-chain pay-
ment channel transactions. Because of the privacy-preserving
nature, it is a challenge to interface with such a system on
low resource devices commonly seen in IoT. However, privacy
preservation in state channels can be a desired property in IoT
payment systems, such as smart meters in the power grid.
Raiden [8], is an Ethereum based payment channel similar
to the Lighting Network. Our protocol can also be adapted to
this style network. Plasma [12], is a scaling solution designed
on Ethereum that enables payment channels as well as more
complex smart contracts to be deployed.
IOTA (MIOTA) [13], is a blockchain designed with low
computation for IoT and web 3.0 protocols. In our case, how-
ever, the security model of this blockchain is quite different of
that from Bitcoin and Ethereum. Additionally, we choose to
use Bitcoin because it is the most widely used and thus easier
to adopt in practice.
C. IoT Integrated with Blockchain
Christidis and Devetsikiotis explore the challenges and
opportunities of blockchain and smart contracts for IoT in [1].
Their work focuses on discovering use cases that distributed
ledger technology can solve and challenges found with inte-
gration of IoT. One challenge that they do not discuss is the
resource limitations of IoT, which is the problem we propose a
solution for. Our solution only covers the value transfer portion
of blockchain technology.
In [14], Aitzhan and Svetinovic propose a token-based
system similar to Bitcoin and coupled with an anonymous
messaging system to provide security and privacy for peer-
to-peer energy trading. They also include the ability to open
unidirectional payment channels for partial payment. Their ap-
proach designs an anonymous market revolving around energy
7trading. In our work, we focus solely on bidirectional payment
channels for the Bitcoin blockchain. While application-specific
blockchains and token systems including [15] may provide a
solution in specific domains, we would like to explore general
purpose solutions within IoT payment systems.
In [16], the authors focus on creating a local energy market
for matching energy orders in a decentralized manner. Their
proposals call for a private or permissible blockchain, which
operates as a decentralized trusted application. In this work,
we focus on integrating the existing end-user devices to IoT
gateways on public trustless blockchains.
In [17], Blockchain is evaluated for use in smart homes for
IoT, but the blockchain proposed does not use a trustless con-
sensus algorithm, which makes it a decentralized database for
recording internet-of-things devices activity. Reference [18]
attempts a similar objective for smart grid sensors and actua-
tors. In our work, we design a protocol that can be generally
applied to public trustless blockchains. Additionally, we aim
to solve the problem of value transfer rather than information
assurance.
Our approach uses the Bitcoin blockchain for our protocol
design. There are many other blockchains that have useful
properties, such as Ethereum [4], Litecoin, various Bitcoin
forks, and many others which have a different block time
and can implement Turing-complete scripting languages or
provide differing features, such as privacy and anonymity.
However, payment channels are still in development and on-
chain transactions will still suffer from the high fee problem
that Bitcoin on-chain transactions do. In our future work, we
will analyze trade-offs between blockchain ecosystems for IoT
and cyber-physical system payments.
VI. CONCLUSION
We design a real-time blockchain-based payment channel
for IoT devices to gateway services, which is less resource
intensive than existing solutions, and show that off-chain pay-
ment channels are feasible for applications where IoT devices
transfer value. We also demonstrate that the protocol is crypto-
economically fair by modeling the protocol as a game, in
which the equilibrium is reached as long as the players follow
the protocol and set the fees appropriately. In the future, we
would like to expand our protocol for IoT devices to interact
with other IoT devices as well as generalize the protocol to
work with payment channels including interoperability with
the existing Lightning Network [6]. We would also like to
explore the ability of privacy-preserving blockchain payment
channels, such as Bolt [11], in order to protect the rights of
end-users in IoT and cyber-physical systems.
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